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This article presents new asset-based measures of bank liquidity that capture and quantify the dynamics 
of liquidity ﬂ  ows within the French banking system between 1993 and 2005. We consider net changes in 
the “stock” of liquidity in banks’ balance sheets as the result of two simultaneous “ﬂ  ows”: the purchases 
and sales of liquid assets. Our “ﬂ  ow approach” allows us to assess the intertemporal dimension of liquidity 
ﬂ  uctuations within the banking system (expansions, contractions and overall reallocation) on the basis
of individual bank data. In turn, these ﬂ  uctuations lend themselves to an insightful cyclical analysis.
Our main results can be summarised as follows. First, we ﬁ  nd substantial evidence of simultaneous 
liquidity expansion and contraction, as well as extensive balance sheet liquidity reshufﬂ  ing, in a context 
where bank liquidity is expanding overall. Second, positive and negative ﬂ  ows procyclically lead the cycle
by approximately two quarters. Third, positive output shocks are likely to have a positive and persistent effect 
on liquidity ﬂ  ows. The liquidity responses to asset price and monetary policy impulses seem in line with the 
idea that liquidity ﬂ  ows are driven by “funding” versus “proﬁ  t” motives in the presence of a trade-off between 
expected returns and interest-rate risk. On the one hand, liquidity is held to ensure the smooth ﬁ  nancing
of banking activities. On the other hand, banks may hold liquidity so as to maximise expected returns. 
Liquidity holdings therefore decline when alternative investment opportunities become more attractive.
From a policy perspective, the results suggest that under normal circumstances, the cross-checking
of liquidity ratios and liquidity ﬂ  ows could prove useful to design a robust prudential approach to liquidity. 
Under extreme circumstances, the traditional concept of “bank liquidity” could be complemented by 
considerations on the liquidity of monetary and other ﬁ  nancial markets when emergency liquidity provision 
is envisaged.
NB: The authors would like to thank M. Baran for useful discussions, C. Ewerhart, J. Fell as well as numerous internal readers for the constructive comments received 
in the drafting process. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily reﬂ  ect those of the Banque de France.ARTICLES
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O
ver the past decades, the rapid expansion
of the ﬁ   nancial system has given rise 
to increasingly diversiﬁ   ed and complex
ﬁ  nancial activities and instruments. It has been 
argued that, in the process, ﬁ  nancial  sector 
developments have played an increasing role in 
shaping and sometimes amplifying macroeconomic 
ﬂ  uctuations.
Concerns about the “excessive” procyclicality of the 
ﬁ  nancial system have in turn prompted calls for 
policy actions in the ﬁ  elds of prudential regulation, 
accounting, risk measurement or monetary policy 
as a whole, in order to enhance ﬁ  nancial system and 
macroeconomic stability.
With this in mind, this article focuses on one speciﬁ  c 
intersection of macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial 
stability, namely bank liquidity. We develop a 
ﬂ   ow approach to analyse the macroeconomic
and cyclical properties of the French banking 
system’s liquidity, and to draw conclusions with 
regard to bank liquidity supervision and lender
of last resort interventions.
The article is structured as follows. Section 1 presents 
the concepts of bank and market liquidity and puts 
them in the perspective of the last resort provision 
of liquidity to ﬁ  nancial institutions. Data and stylised 
facts are described in Section 2, while our concepts 
and measurement methods are proposed in Section 3. 
Section 4 articulates our analysis and results.
1| BANK LIQUIDITY,
MARKET LIQUIDITY
AND THE LENDER OF LAST RESORT
An appropriate analysis of bank liquidity for 
macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial stability purposes 
could start with a holistic approach that takes into 
account the interdependencies between market 
liquidity and bank liquidity (1|1). The link between 
liquidity management at the bank level and market 
practices indeed becomes particularly crucial in crisis 
situations where vanishing liquidity often causes 
market distress, contagion and systemic effects (1|2). 
It is certainly because the primary responsibility 
for preventing any sources of such instability lies 
with the liquidity and risk management function
of the banks themselves that occurrences of lender
of last  resort interventions are often viewed as 
second-best and debated on those grounds (1|3).
1|1 Bank liquidity and market liquidity
Bank liquidity is commonly understood to be “the 
ability to meet cash obligations when due” and deﬁ  ned 
in two ways.1 The banking literature originally focused 
on a narrow deﬁ  nition of liquidity, also labelled 
“funding liquidity”. Funding liquidity encompasses 
the liquidity (i.e. cash or assets readily transformable 
into cash and held for that purpose) needed either 
to accommodate counterparties’ withdrawal
of short-term funding, or to support the
bank’s operations. This dimension of liquidity is 
presumably predominant in the context of maturity 
transformation, as traditionally effected by banks.
The second –broader– deﬁ  nition of bank liquidity 
considers that banks are also involved, potentially 
heavily, in asset trading. This second dimension, 
which is closer to (and sometimes also labelled) “market 
liquidity”, relates to the ability of banks to literally 
liquidate a non-cash asset –e.g. an investment security 
originally bought to be held to maturity– in a last 
resort context so as to raise central bank money.2
Analogies between market and bank liquidity 
are underlined by Borio (2004), who states that 
“the genesis of market distress resembles quite 
closely that of banking distress”. Understanding the 
collective behaviour of market participants and the 
interdependencies between individual ﬁ  nancial 
institutions and market dynamics therefore seems 
meaningful for monetary and ﬁ  nancial stability 
purposes (Davis, 1994).3
1  This twofold deﬁ  nition was adopted by the Joint Forum in 2004.
2  For example, holding a liquid instrument may be of little value in an emergency situation if suddenly, no trading partner willing to buy the supposedly
liquid asset at a reasonable price can be found on the market. In that sense, bank liquidity and market illiquidity may well coexist. Also, as noted by Brunnermeier
and Pedersen (2005), funding liquidity to dealers, investment banks, etc. enhances trading and market liquidity. Reciprocally, market liquidity, by improving the 
collateral value of assets (margins are typically lower in a liquid market), eases funding constraints.
3  One should also keep in mind that some banks are large players on (in particular money) markets and contribute to a large part of market turnover
(Hartmann and Valla, 2006), thereby also reinforcing the interaction between market and bank liquidity.ARTICLES
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1|2  Illiquidity risk, contagion
  and systemic effects
The ﬁ   rst symptoms of a liquidity crisis in the 
banking system generally take the form of a liquidity 
deﬁ  cit in the balance sheet of a bank. Much has 
been written on the mechanism of “bank runs” 
since the seminal contribution of Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983). Liquidity risk, if materialised in 
the case of a so-called “systemic” institution, may 
entail contagion and jeopardise macroeconomic and 
ﬁ  nancial stability. Contagion has been described in 
the context of peer monitoring on the money market
(Rochet and Tirole, 1996), liquidation of interbank 
deposits in response to unexpected deposit 
withdrawals (Allen and Gale, 2000) or expected 
scarce reserves (Freixas, Parigi and Rochet, 2000) 
or adverse selection in interbank lending when the 
solvency statute of interbank borrowers is unknown 
(Flannery, 1996).
Recent literature on liquidity and banking crises 
has identiﬁ  ed a number of central factors driving 
contagious failures of ﬁ  nancial  institutions.
These factors include:
• the limited capacity of ﬁ  nancial markets to absorb 
asset sales (Allen and Gale, 2002, 2004, 2005;
Gorton and Huang, 2002; Schnabel and Shin, 2002),
• the inefﬁ  ciency of the mechanisms at work when assets 
need to be liquidated (Diamond and Rajan, 2000),
• the strength of direct balance sheet interlinkages 
(Cifuentes, 2002; Eichberger and Summer, 2005)4,
•  and phenomena related to changes in asset 
prices.5 For example, marking to market the asset 
book can generate endogenous asset sales and lead 
to contagious failures. In this context, liquidity 
requirements can –unlike capital requirements– 
can be effective in forestalling contagious failures 
(Cifuentes, Ferrucci and Shin, 2005).
Overall, the literature and practical experience 
suggest that bank and market instability are rare 
but potentially damaging events. While regulation 
and supervision have the task of ensuring that 
liquidity and risk management functions of 
banks remain at all times supportive of ﬁ  nancial 
stability, it may not be possible to eliminate all 
risks of instability ex ante. In such cases, central 
banks are in a unique position to provide liquidity
when warranted it is required.
1|3  Bank liquidity and the lender
  of last resort (LLR)
The provision of emergency liquidity assistance in 
crisis circumstances is often referred to as last resort 
lending (LLR).6 The LLR issue arises in the ﬁ  rst place 
from the potential externality a failing bank may have 
on both the ﬁ  nancial sector and the real economy, 
in a context where this externality cannot be easily 
eliminated due to asymmetric information. 
LLR interventions consist in the exceptional 
provision, under speciﬁ   c stress conditions, of 
short-term loans to commercial banks facing acute 
liquidity problems. Bank liquidity therefore lies at 
the heart of LLR policy issues. Views on the “classic” 
approach to LLR interventions, rooted in the works
of Thornton (1802) and Bagehot (1873), have given
rise to distinct “streams of thought”. Their coexistence 
suggests that no consensus has been reached on the 
modalities of optimal and efﬁ  cient interventions.7
The classic “Thornton-Bagehot” principle relies
on a failure in the interbank market due to 
asymmetric information on banks’ solvency. Under 
asymmetric information, the willingness to pay a 
high interest rate following an adverse liquidity 
shock may in fact be interpreted as a signal of 
increased riskiness. If so, markets fail to insure 
against liquidity shocks and the central banks
4 See  Cifuentes  et al. (2005) for references to speciﬁ  c country studies in Switzerland, Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom and Austria. Models using 
actual cross-exposures in real banking systems are typically calibrated to simulate the effects of an individual failure on the system as a whole.
5  The liquidity-based approach to understanding ﬁ  nancial crises via asset price ﬂ  uctuations has been developed at length by F. Allen and D. Gale. With incomplete 
markets, ﬁ  nancial institutions may be forced to sell assets to obtain liquidity. Because the supply of and demand for liquidity are likely to be inelastic in the
short-run, even a little aggregate uncertainty may cause large ﬂ  uctuations in asset prices (among others, Allen and Gale (2005) and references therein).
6  In this article, LLR refers to such interventions as conducted by central banks.
7  See Bordo (1990) for a comprehensive review, on which this paragraph is based.ARTICLES
Bank liquidity and ﬁ  nancial stability
92  Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 9 • December 2006
should step in.8 9 However, the mere existence
of market failures has been questioned by the
“free banking” approach, which contends that markets 
themselves are capable of protecting the banking 
system from panics (Selgin, 1988 and 1989). A
third view claims that central bank operations targeted 
at speciﬁ  c ailing institutions are simply unnecessary. 
Open market operations aimed at rebalancing 
liquidity conditions for the market as a whole would 
sufﬁ  ce to ensure the stability of the ﬁ  nancial system 
(Goodfriend and King, 1988). A fourth view asserts 
that the clear-cut distinction between illiquidity and 
insolvency is a myth, at least ex ante. As a result, 
emergency lending facilities should be extended when 
needed, even though they do create moral hazard 
problems whereby banks may be tempted to adopt a 
more risky behaviour (Goodhart, 1987 and 1995). The 
possibility of contagion adds a compelling ﬁ  nancial 
stability argument to systematic interventions for 
systemic institutions (Solow, 1982). Although actual 
LLR interventions are exceptional, anecdotal evidence 
suggests that this inherent difﬁ   culty (grey area 
between illiquidity and insolvency, moral hazard) 
has not been removed as yet.
In ﬁ  ne, the decision to supply emergency liquidity 
assistance for ﬁ  nancial stability purposes hinges on 
the appreciation of the social cost associated with 
individual bank failures, bank panics or contagion 
effects. Available evidence suggests that LLR 
mechanisms have helped (Miron, 1986; Bordo, 1990;
Eichengreen and Portes, 1986) or could have helped 
(Friedman and Schwartz, 1963) avoid costly bank 
panics. Contagion effects have been shown to 
be potentially costly (Aharony and Swary, 1983; 
Herring and Vankudre, 1987 ; Saunders, 1987), 
lending support overall to the usefulness of rescuing 
ailing institutions.10
Recent contributions have investigated the 
conditions under which LLR interventions may 
actually fail to ensure macroeconomic and ﬁ  nancial 
stability (Antinolﬁ  , Huybens and Keister, 2001).
However, this literature concentrates on emerging 
economies and is conﬁ  ned to the international 
dimension of the lender of last resort (Chang
and Velasco, 2000). 
2| DATA AND STYLISED FACTS
ON THE FRENCH BANKING INDUSTRY
The French supervisory authority, the Commission 
bancaire, collects quarterly balance sheet data on an 
individual and consolidated basis for all banks falling 
under its regulation. Complete balance sheets are 
available from 1993-Q1 to 2005-Q1.11
This period was one of marked consolidation in 
the French banking industry, as evidenced by the 
dramatic fall in the number of banks (from 1,400 
to 850 in our panel) over the decade (Chart 1). 
In parallel, a number of regulatory changes took 
place during this period (they will be discussed 
below). Finally, the launch of Stage III of EMU in
January 1999 spurred the development and 
integration of euro money markets and created a 
new environment for banks’ liquidity management 
in Europe (see Bernhardsen and Ejerskov, 2005,
or Hartmann and Valla, 2006).
8  It interest rate increases could also lead to price disruptions that may “crowd out” market participants, leading to market closure.
9  Bagehot principles read as follows: the LLR should lend to:
  • illiquid but solvent ﬁ  nancial institutions;
  • at a penalty rate so as to avoid ﬁ  nancial institutions using the funds to ﬁ  nance lending operations;
  • and against good collateral;
  • this LLR policy must be publicly announced ex-ante in a credible way.
10  Further references to ﬁ  nancial stability and LLR policy, with some links to the euro area, may be found in Hartmann and Valla (2006).
11  In selecting our panel, we tried to keep the most representative picture of the banking system over the sample period by removing banks subject to very speciﬁ  c 
regimes (categories 0, 8 and 9 in the Commission bancaire’s nomenclature, corresponding respectively to public entities such as the Treasury or the Banque de 
France, speciﬁ  c securities ﬁ  nancial corporations, and “miscellaneous” bodies).
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Alongside this consolidation process, the 
structure of the French banking industry evolved 
towards an increase in the share of banks and 
mutualist or co-operative institutions (their 
joint share rose from roughly less than 40% to 
more than 50%), while the share of ﬁ  nancial 
institutions declined by the same proportion
(from 58% to 47% approximately, see Chart 2).
The liquidity structure of French banks as a share 
of their total assets can be seen in Chart 3.12 While 
remaining the main component of our liquidity 
measure, short-term and interbank lending declined 
somewhat over the period (from 35% to 30%). 
By contrast, the share of securities bought under 
repurchase agreements and trading securities rose 
steadily, from 2% to 8% respectively. The share of 
investment securities (4%) and net off-balance-sheet 
ﬁ  nancing commitments (1%) remained stable over 
the period under review.
3| MEASURING BANK LIQUIDITY
Our analysis of bank liquidity at the aggregate level 
is presented in this section. After a discussion of 
the concept and measurement of “gross liquidity
ﬂ  ows” (3|1), methodological considerations associated 
with this concept are underlined (3|2). Aggregate 
liquidity measures are then presented (3|3).
3|1  Gross liquidity ﬂ  ows:
  concepts and measurement
The concept of “gross ﬂ  ows” originates from labour 
market turnover studies.13 Our efforts to measure 
and quantify liquidity dynamics in the banking 
sector build on this literature. This approach allows 
us to describe gross quantities of liquidity that ﬂ  ow 
in and out of the French banking system’s balance 
sheet, as well as the rate at which liquidity is overall 
reallocated across banks. In turn, these ﬂ  uctuations 
lend themselves to an insightful cyclical analysis.
An individual bank expands (contracts) liquidity 
in a given quarter if its liquidity growth is positive 
(negative). For example, a bank holding 100,000 
worth of liquid assets in 1993-Q1 and 110,000 
(respectively  90,000) in 1993-Q2 would have 
expanded (respectively contracted) liquidity in this 
quarter at a rate of 10%. At the aggregate level, gross 
liquidity expansion (contraction) is proxied by the 
sum of the absolute values of all liquidity changes 
across banks with positive (negative) liquidity 
growth. Gross rates of expansion and contraction 
are then computed. For example, if the banking 
system is composed of two banks of similar size 
Chart 2
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Source: Commission bancaire; authors’ calculations.
12  Our measure of bank liquidity is described in Box 1.
13  Key references in this area include Davis and Haltiwanger (1992). More recently, estimates of gross credit ﬂ  ows have been conducted in an analogous way,
see Craig and Haubrich (2000) and Dell’Ariccia and Garibaldi (2005).ARTICLES
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which expand and contract liquidity at the same 
rate, then we consider that liquidity stagnates at the 
aggregate level. A formal deﬁ  nition of those concepts 
is presented in Box 2.
At the bank level, liquidity contraction (represented 
by a negative value of the grow rate of expansion) 
can stem from either the active reduction in liquid 
portfolios, or from the fact that a temporary operation 
(e.g. a repo) is not rolled over at maturity and does 
not correspond to an increase in other liquid items. 
Both events lead to a reduction in liquidity.
The interpretation of the aggregate series thereby 
obtained depends on how one measures growth at 
the bank level. In this article, we distinguish between 
gross nominal and gross idiosyncratic liquidity ﬂ  ows. 
First, nominal ﬂ  ows measure growth in absolute 
terms, as illustrated above. They reﬂ  ect nominal 
liquidity expansion or contraction within the 
Box 1
Measuring bank liquidity
Liquidity management within a ﬁ  nancial institution is governed by two main criteria. First, the institution should be sure 
that appropriate, low-cost funding is available at short notice. This might involve holding a portfolio of assets that can 
easily be sold, holding signiﬁ  cant volumes of stable liabilities, or maintaining credit lines with other ﬁ  nancial institutions. 
Second, liquidity management also needs to comply with proﬁ  tability requirements. Financial stability issues lie exactly at 
this liquidity/proﬁ  tability nexus: conditions should be ensured for banks to manage liquidity stocks and ﬂ  ows in the most 
proﬁ  table manner that at the same time does not jeopardise ﬁ  nancial stability.
In France, bank liquidity is monitored on the basis of a liquidity ratio. The Commission bancaire’s liquidity requirement 
consists in a monthly report on banks’ global liquid assets and liabilities, which includes cash positions, claims including
repo-related claims with at most one month remaining maturity, negotiable securities, as well as off-balance-sheet 
commitments and available liquidity lines. Using this information, the Commission bancaire establishes the ratio of liquid 
assets to liquid liabilities using a weighting scheme to reﬂ  ect the likelihood of items being rolled over or being available 
in the event of a liquidity squeeze. The weighting scheme thereby recognises that assets that are liquid may be realized 
only with some delay and at some risk. This ratio has to be maintained above 100% at all times. The liquidity coefﬁ  cient 
used by the Commission bancaire belongs to the family of “Asset-Liability” liquidity coefﬁ  cients, based on measures 
of both liquid assets and liquid liabilities. Those coefﬁ  cients are traditionally preferred for supervisory purposes on the 
grounds that banks’ liquidity management relates not only to the liquidity of their assets but also to the nature, structure 
and transformation of their liabilities. 
The measure presented in this article departs from the current prudential approach along two main lines. First, it is 
exclusively asset-based. Second, it is to some extent “agnostic”, in that it does not rely on a normative weighting scheme 
across asset categories, and no threshold value is proposed to assess whether a bank has “too little” liquidity. We chose 
to concentrate exclusively on assets in order to decouple the monitored indicator from ﬂ  uctuations induced by changes in 
the liability side of banks’ balance sheet. No information stemming from the current prudential ratio is used in this process. 
The value-added of our indicator lies in its dynamic (ﬂ  ow) and panel-based dimensions. Our liquidity measure is based 
on the following asset categories: cash management and interbank transactions, securities bought under repurchase 
agreements, trading securities, investment securities, to which we add net off-balance-sheet ﬁ  nancing commitments
(i.e. ﬁ  nancing commitments received minus ﬁ  nancing commitments given to credit institutions). This measure belongs to 
the group of “Asset-based” liquidity indicators and is independent from the liability structure of banks’ balance sheet.
In that respect, it should be kept in mind that our aim is to propose a methodology and assess its performance on a
broad-based liquidity measure. Alternative indicators that could be ranked according to their degree of liquidity could be in 
turn generated. For example, one may ask whether investment securities are “liquid enough” to qualify for the construction
of a liquidity measure, as those assets are meant to be purchased with the aim of being durably kept in the books. Since 
investment securities are ﬁ  xed-income instruments that may be sold promptly in case of emergency, we decided to keep 
them in our measure. Another suggestion could be to concentrate only on speciﬁ  c sub-items of the chosen liquidity 
categories (in particular in the cash management and interbank transactions category, which is rather broad). Although 
a ﬁ  rst check of alternative measures seems to produce outcomes coherent with the results presented in this article, 
reﬁ  ned applications of this approach would certainly generate fruitful and potentially new insights regarding bank liquidity.
In ﬁ  ne, the cross checking of such measures with liquidity ratios (like the coefﬁ  cient currently monitored by the Commission 
bancaire) may prove informative and robust for prudential purposes.ARTICLES
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Box 2
Bank liquidity ﬂ  ows
Using the individual bank balance sheet data described in Section 2, we deﬁ  ne lit as the value of liquid assets of bank i at 
quarter t. The change in total liquidity is then given by ∆lit = lit – lit-1. The bias introduced by bank mergers (see Section 3|2)
is corrected as follows. Consider that bank i absorbs bank j between t and t-1. In the absence of any other change in the 
structure of balance sheets, the liquidity registered for bank j at time t will be zero, while that registered by bank i will be 
equal to the sum of its own liquidity plus that of the absorbed bank j. Taking into account the changes in liquidity that occurred 
between t-1 and t, the liquidity of bank i at t will be equal to its own liquidity at t-1, plus the changes in its own liquidity, plus 
the liquidity of bank j at t-1, plus the changes in bank j’s liquidity between t-1 and t. In parallel, the liquidity of bank j at t will 
be zero. Without further corrections, the liquidity of j at t-1 would be counted twice, leading to an overestimation of both 
positive and negative liquidity ﬂ  ows. We therefore need to subtract the t-1 liquidity of bank j from the t liquidity of bank i,
and add it to the liquidity of bank j at t. Formally, our corrected measure ∆l’it reads:
∆l’
it = ∆l






where Aikt and Bit are indicator variables and N the total number of banks at time t. Aikt takes the value 1 when bank i
absorbs bank j at t, 0 otherwise. Bit takes the value 1 when i is absorbed at t, 0 otherwise. Note that this approach allows 
for simultaneous mergers where one bank absorbs more than one institution.
The adjusted growth rate of liquidity is therefore given by:
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for each bank i. At the bank level, all liquidity contractions (respectively expansions) give rise to a negative (respectively 
positive) value of git. The cross section of gits obtained for each quarter is then aggregated using two simple positive/negative 
partition rules.
Partition rule 1: nominal gross liquidity ﬂ  ows
Nominal gross ﬂ  ows are deﬁ  ned according to a partition rule around zero. The aggregate liquidity expansion rate between 
t-1 and t, POS
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The term in parenthesis weights individual growth rates by the bank’s average share of the total liquidity. Likewise, the 
aggregate liquidity contraction rate NEG
nom
t is deﬁ  ned over the absolute value of aggregated weighted growth rates:
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Nominal measures are principally useful to analyse cyclical properties of liquidity ﬂ  ows.
Partition rule 2: idiosyncratic gross liquidity ﬂ  ows
Idiosyncratic gross ﬂ  ows are deﬁ  ned according to a partition rule around the trend followed by the banking industry as a 
whole. This relative measure reﬂ  ects the extent to which each bank distinguishes itself from the industry trend. This latter 
is proxied using the Hodrick-Prescott ﬁ  lter of aggregate liquidity growth (noted g
tr
t) with a standard quarterly smoothing 







The idiosyncratic positive and negative liquidity ﬂ  ows rates are deﬁ  ned as:
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banking system on aggregate. Second, idiosyncratic 
ﬂ  ows measure liquidity growth relative to aggregate 
trend growth. They are qualiﬁ  ed as “idiosyncratic” in 
that they reﬂ  ect purely bank-speciﬁ  c factors (speciﬁ  c 
trading strategies, isolated liquidity shocks, changes 
in corporate governance or internal structures, 
etc.). For example, a bank may increase its liquidity 
holdings by 10% in a given quarter when the 
banking industry increases its liquidity holdings by a
6% trend. The idiosyncratic component of that 
bank’s liquidity inﬂ  ow is equal to 4%. Idiosyncratic 
ﬂ  ows reﬂ  ect the degree of heterogeneity of banks 
when expanding or contracting liquidity. 
3|2 Methodological  issues
Before describing the proposed liquidity measures 
in more detail, it should be noted that they are 
subject to two main methodological problems. 
Firstly, they ignore liquidity expansions and 
contractions that may simultaneously occur within 
each reporting entity, i.e. within each bank. This 
biases our estimates downwards, since liquidity 
reallocation is likely to occur across different desks 
(for example between the repo desk and the treasury 
desk) of a bank. However, our data does account
for liquidity ﬂ   ows across entities of the same 
banking group, as we use the BAFI 4000 Reporting 
Files that are collected institution-by-institution in 
a non-consolidated way.14
Secondly, ﬂ   ow measures may overestimate 
gross ﬂ   ows by recording unwarranted liquidity 
reallocations due to mergers and acquisitions. This 
bias is potentially problematic. We therefore chose to 
clean the data on the basis of merger ﬁ  les provided 
by the Banque de France division –DECEI/CECEI– 
that registers bank creations, closures and mergers
(see Box 2 for details).
3|3  Aggregate liquidity measures
Gross liquidity ﬂ   ows are constructed as a
cross-sectional aggregation of positive and negative 
changes in stocks as measured in quarterly balance 
sheet statements. The positive/negative partition of 
14 Liquidity  ﬂ  ows occuring between banks of the same group can not be isolated from those effected across different groups. As a result, negative and positive ﬂ  ows 
coexisting across banks that belong to the same group may reﬂ  ect the intra-group reallocation of liquidity. Intra-group liquidity management has gained importance 
in France –in particular for mutualist banks– as the consolidation process has made headway.
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Idiosyncratic measures are relevant for the analysis of average liquidity ﬂ  ows.
Overall, one should keep in mind that at the aggregate level, negative ﬂ  ows do not necessarily reﬂ  ect a generalised reduction 
in liquidity buffers. Likewise, positive ﬂ  ows do not imply an expansion of liquidity buffers. Positive and negative ﬂ  ows may 
coexist, but only the net measure of liquidity ﬂ  ows can indicate whether the liquidity of the banking system’s balance sheet 


















t depicts the net growth rate of gross liquidity, while NET
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Finally, one may wish to get a sense of the overall reallocation of liquidity that occurs between banks. In the nominal case, 
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the cross-sectional distribution is done in two ways, 
nominal and idiosyncratic. Nominal aggregates are 
the sums of the individual banks’ liquidity growth 
rates relative to zero, weighted by market share. 
Idiosyncratic aggregates are the weighted sums
of the individual banks’ liquidity growth rates
relative to the industry trend. The construction
of liquidity measures is presented in Box 2.
The two aggregation strategies shed light on 
different dimensions of liquidity dynamics. Nominal 
growth rates show the macroeconomic evolution 
of liquid balance sheet items. This evolution may 
be substantial in a context where, for exogenous 
reasons, aggregate liquidity grows strongly. An 
example would be the steep growth in bank liquidity 
witnessed since the start of Stage III of EMU, also 
reﬂ   ected in the strong dynamics of nominal monetary 
aggregates in the euro area. Nominal measures are 
therefore suitable for studying the cyclical properties
of bank liquidity. In a banking system that grows 
along a trend, idiosyncratic ﬂ  ows reﬂ  ect individual 
differences in bank liquidity management. 
These ﬂ  ows are the macroeconomic symptom of 
heterogenous bank behaviour at the microlevel.
We can also derive net growth rates of liquidity 
together with “shadow” measures of liquidity 
reallocation. Net ﬂ  ows simply indicate whether 
banks lost or gained liquidity over a quarter. 
“Shadow”, or excess, ﬂ  ows, picture the extent to 
which overall liquidity reallocation actually occurs 
across banks. For example, a bank whose liquidity 
grew in net terms by 1% over a given quarter may 
in fact have actively engaged in liquidity trading to 
a much wider extent than what the net variation 
alone would suggest. These effects can be accounted 
for by looking at nominal reallocation, i.e. aggregate 
expansion and contraction in excess of the net 
liquidity change, and idiosyncratic reallocation.
4| RESULTS
4|1 Gross nominal liquidity ﬂ  uctuations
Estimates of gross nominal liquidity ﬂ  ows  are 
reproduced in Chart 4. Their examination reveals 
that on average, positive ﬂ  ows have been larger than 
negative ﬂ  ows, resulting in net nominal liquidity 
ﬂ  ows growing by some 1% per quarter. This is 
Chart 4
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not surprising in a context where bank liquidity is 
expanding overall. More interestingly, substantial 
liquidity expansion and contraction take place 
simultaneously along the sample, at a rate of 6% and 
5% per quarter (Table 1), implying active market 
trading the beyond an already substantial growth in 
aggregate bank liquidity. A check of the behaviour 
of each liquidity subcomponent reveals that this 
trading intensity has occurred in all market segments 
involved in liquidity trading (money markets as well 
as capital markets for liquid instruments).
Negative and net nominal ﬂ  ows reveal that aggregate 
behaviour may have been atypical on two occasions, 
in early 1996 and early 2000. Both in 1996 and 2000, 
liquidity outﬂ   ows markedly –but temporarily– 
increased, translating into large negative net liquidity 
adjustments.
Although causality can not be assessed, it is very 
likely that developments in 2000-Q1 depict a
correction of liquidity loadings in anticipation
of « Y2K » (year 2000). 
The 1996-Q1 episode is less straightforward to 
explain. A closer look at regulatory events around 
that time reveals that this quarter coincides with the 
implementation of a number of European Council 
Directives geared towards the harmonisation
of banking activities. In particular, the Directive 
authorising the inclusion of legally binding netting 
agreements for prudential purposes was approved 
15  Preparatory work authorising the inclusion of legally binding netting agreements for prudential purposes led to a common proposal adopted by the
European Council on 5 September 1995. The European Directive was ﬁ  nally approved early 1995. In parallel, the post-BCCI European Directive ensuring that the 
structures of a group to which a credit institution belongs do not pose a threat to its supervision, was adopted by the European Parliament and the European Council
on 29 June 1996 and implemented in the ﬁ  rst quarter of 1996. At the same time, the Basel Committee on banking supervision ﬁ  nalised its framework on the 
prudential treatment of market risk (extension of own fund covering to market risk and acknowledgement of internal credit risk models. See Commission bancaire 
(1996). The inclusion of netting agreements in prudential ratios de facto reduced own fund requirements underlying solvency ratios, as off-balance-sheet interest rate
and foreign exchange instruments would, as from then, be taken into account in net and not gross terms, i.e. after all contracts termed with a given counterpart 
had been compensated. Such an adjustment would show up only once in liquidity growth rates, as it does in Chart 4.
Table 1
Nominal and idiosyncratic liquidity ﬂ  ows –Descriptive Statistics
Flows Obs. Average Std. Error Min Max
Nominal
Positive 49 0.059 0.021 0.000 0.122
Negative 48 0.052 0.041 0.020 0.281
Net 48 0.009 0.049 –0.232 0.093
Idiosyncratic
Total reallocation  48 0.081 0.022 0.039 0.134
Positive 49 0.041 0.031 0.000 0.175
Negative 48 3.58e-8 3.22e-8 1.02e-8 2.25e-7
and implemented at that time.15 However, nothing 
guarantees that solvency regulation is the crucial 
point. After all, measures of own funds are usually 
determined on the basis of liabilities positions 
with at best an ambiguous effect on the sign of 
liquidity ﬂ  ows. In this light, it is more likely that the 
prudential acknowledgement of netting agreements 
simply led to a reduction of liquidity risk exposure 
for commercial banks, allowing them to hold less 
liquid assets.
Turning to deviations of ﬂ  ows from the industry 
trend, the idiosyncratic building-up of liquidity is 
substantial (idiosyncratic and nominal positive ﬂ  ows 
have comparable orders of magnitude), suggesting 
that a large number of banks expand in excess 
of trend growth. We visually checked whether 
idiosyncratic positive ﬂ   ows could result from 
aggregation issues or aggregate structural changes 
(that could be due to factors affecting the banking 
sector as a whole) and found that only a small part 
of aggregate heterogeneity seems to be accounted 
for by composition effects across liquidity lines or 
by differences across banks of different sizes. This 
conjecture could be investigated more formally.
Finally, total, or “shadow”, liquidity reallocation, 
the expansion and contraction in excess of net 
changes, amounts to about 8% per quarter. In other 
words, some 8% of the aggregate liquidity in the 
banking system’s balance sheet is reshufﬂ  ed among 
individual banks each quarter.ARTICLES
Bank liquidity and ﬁ  nancial stability
Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 9 • December 2006  99
4|2 Bank  liquidity
  and the macroeconomic cycle
The article now turns to the macroeconomic 
regularities that characterise bank liquidity ﬂ  ows. 
The French business cycle and our measures of bank 
liquidity are depicted in Chart 5. In this section, 
measures of liquidity ﬂ  ows have been seasonally 
adjusted using the X12 procedure.
As a useful starting point, we focus on the dynamic 
correlations between bank liquidity and French real 
GDP growth in France (Table 2). First, it turns out 
that liquidity expansions are strongly correlated 
with GDP growth. Positive ﬂ  ows lead the cycle by 
one to two quarters in a procyclical way. Second, 
liquidity outﬂ   ows are also positively correlated 
with the cycle (although more mildly), which they 
lead by two to three quarters. This suggests a rather 
procyclical character of banks’ liquidity management.
However, excess balance-sheet reallocation is 
slightly countercyclical and lags the cycle by one to
two quarters. These observations are discussed in turn.
One possible explanation for similar timing patterns 
of positive and negative liquidity ﬂ  ows relative to the 
cycle lies in the dual function (and distinct valuation) 
of liquidity within a bank. On the one hand,
liquidity is held pure for “funding” purposes.16
Appetite for liquidity therefore increases when the 
level of economic activity picks up, as reﬁ  nancing 
needs associated inter alia with a more sustained 
loan supply, also increase during expansions. 
Furthermore, it may be worth “frontloading” the 
acquisition of liquidity in the early phases of an 
economic upturn in anticipation of a pick-up in 
lending activity, hence the anticipation of positive 
ﬂ  ows ahead of the cycle. On the other hand, banks 
may hold liquidity for “trading” purposes. Such 
holdings are driven by expected returns and will be 
adjusted downwards during economic expansions, 
as more proﬁ   table investment opportunities 
Chart 5
Aggregate bank liquidity ﬂ  ows
















Positive gross nominal flows (left-hand scale)
French GDP (right-hand scale)



















Negative gross nominal flows (left-hand scale)
French GDP (right-hand scale)























Reallocation of liquidity in excess of net changes
(left-hand scale)
French GDP (right-hand scale)
1994 1993 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Source: OECD; authors’ calculations.
Table 2
Dynamic cross-correlations of French GDP with gross nominal ﬂ  ows
 x(-4) x(-3) x(-2) x(-1) x x(+1) x(+2) x(+3) x(+4)
Positive 0.35 0.55 0.64 0.60 0.47 0.32 0.15 0.00 –0.12
Negative 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.12 0.06 0.00 –0.06 –0.10
Excess –0.05 –0.03 –0.07 –0.15 –0.21 –0.25 –0.24 –0.24 –0.23
16  The term “funding” refers to “bank funding”. One could also have in mind the liquidity commitments taken up by banks, which can be mobilised in case
of stress (margin calls, rating changes, etc).ARTICLES
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become available in other capital market segments. 
Conversely, downturns are accompanied
by “ﬂ  ights to quality” whereby liquidity outﬂ  ows 
decelerate. These cyclical downward adjustments 
are mirrored in the observed properties of negative 
nominal ﬂ  ows.17
Which of these effects dominates at the bank 
level ultimately depends on various bank –or 
sector–speciﬁ   c factors. Liquidity managers may 
wish to “prefer liquidity over proﬁ  ts”, in which 
case the ﬁ  rst effect would dominate. It may also 
be that the liquid share of assets quantiﬁ  ed in a
bank’s balance sheet is spread across segmented
in-house entities or desks whose portfolio decisions 
need not be motivated by the same objectives. At the 
aggregate level, the marked positive idiosyncratic 
measures (Table 1) may suggest that the French 
banking system tends to be “macroeconomically 
cautious” when managing its liquidity. This 
preference is consistent with regulatory constraints 
on banks’ liquidity management, suggesting that the 
current framework is conducive to stability-oriented 
bank behaviour.
Finally, “excess” balance-sheet reallocation is 
slightly countercyclical and lags the cycle by one 
to two quarters. This timing pattern may partly 
relate to the endogenous nature of liquidity trading 
to both banking sector behaviour and market 
activity. Recall that “excess” liquidity reallocation 
reﬂ   ects the extent of liquidity reshufﬂ  ing  that 
effectively takes place on top of the visible netting
of in-and outﬂ  ows. Its moderate countercyclicality 
means that banks engage in liquidity trading more 
intensively (and with some lag) during downturns 
than during phases of economic expansion. Given 
the link between market and bank funding liquidity 
discussed in Section 1|1, ensuring the smooth 
and liquid functioning of markets at times when 
banks intensify their (liquid) asset trading activity 
could become a ﬁ   nancial stability objective. In 
particular, the occurrences of liquidity dry-ups may 
generate vulnerability at a time when banks tend 
to intensify their trading. Our measure suggests 
this happens following economic downturns,
with a one-to-three quarter lag.18
A further operational implication of macroeconomic 
liquidity ﬂ  ows stems from the possible mismatched 
timing of changes in demand and supply of 
aggregate liquidity. The stronger comovement of 
positive liquidity ﬂ  ows (which in theory imply an 
acceleration of growth in the demand for liquidity) 
with GDP ahead of turning points may suggest that 
risks of excess demand (respectively supply) in the 
markets for liquid assets may be more acute ahead 
of economic upturns (respectively downturns).19
Institutions that would be subject to unforeseen 
adverse liquidity shocks may therefore have to face 
relatively stringent market conditions (likely, in turn, 
to worsen their vulnerability) ahead of upturns. The 
likelihood of LLR interventions would also be more 
acute. A closer monitoring of vulnerable institutions 
may therefore be warranted during the two quarters 
preceding economic upturns.
4|3  Responses of liquidity ﬂ  ows
  to macroeconomic shocks
We are now interested in the relationship between 
fundamental disturbances to key macroeconomic 
variables and bank liquidity. Since plots and 
correlations are suggestive but not conclusive, 
this investigation is done within a structural VAR 
model deﬁ  ned on output, stock prices, positive 
and negative nominal ﬂ  ows, and the short-run 
nominal interest rate taken to be the monetary 
policy instrument. All variables are speciﬁ  ed in 
quarterly growth rates except the interest rate, 
taken in (quarterly) levels.20
The approach consists of a two-stage procedure. In 
the estimation stage, an unrestricted VAR model is 
estimated. In the identiﬁ  cation stage, restrictions are 
imposed to derive a structural form from which impulse 
17  An alternative explanation based on the precautionary versus speculative motive would be that banks tend to increase their demand for liquidity in order to 
protect themselves from capital losses due to anticipated interest rate increases. In this case, it would be interesting to check the dynamic correlations between
liquidity ﬂ  ows and the monetary policy interest rate.
18  Information about overall interbank liquidity trading volumes are contained in our measure of “excess” liquidity. Table 2 suggests that the growth
of overall liquidity exchange intensiﬁ  es during economic downturns with a one quarter lag.
19  The lagged countercyclicality of excess liquidity, together with the milder procyclicality of negative liquidity ﬂ  ows conﬁ  rms this assessment.
20  French output and stock prices are deﬁ  ned as the log-differenced quarterly French GDP and the CAC40 index. The short-term interest rate is the 3-month money 
market interest rate measured on a quaterly basis. Seasonally adjusted positive and negative liquidity ﬂ  ows, measured in growth rates, have been constructed 
according to the methodology described above. Finally, 1996-Q1 and 2000-Q1 have been dummied out. Seasonal adjustment has been implemented using the X-12 
procedure. VAR estimations and IRF computations have been conducted in E-views 5.ARTICLES
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perspective, the dynamic reaction of liquidity ﬂ  ows 
remains in line with standard theory according 
to which liquidity reacts negatively to interest 
rate increases. The counterintuitive impact of 
interest rate shocks may be related to the trade-off
between expected returns and interest-rate risk. 
Since banks’ liabilities typically tend to rotate 
or be repriced faster than their assets, interest 
expenditures typically change more than interest 
income in the short run. An interest rate rise would 
therefore potentially squeeze proﬁ  ts. Alternatively, 
positive interest rate shocks mechanically induce 
a decline in the market value of interest-bearing 
instruments. This decline may be larger for assets 
than for liabilities, leading to a decline in net value. 
Both events increase the need for liquidity.
Chart 6
Responses to one standard deviation structural shocks
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response functions of bank liquidity to fundamental 
macroeconomic shocks can be calculated.21
The choice of which restrictions to impose is the 
subject of the structural VAR literature, see for 
example Sims (1980), Blanchard and Quah (1989) 
or King et al. (1991). To derive the impulse response 
functions, we are free to impose a variety of 
identiﬁ  cation schemes. In this example, we chose 
to impose long-run restrictions à la Blanchard
and Quah (1989), implying inter alia that monetary 
policy shocks have no long run effect on output. 
Note however that the paucity of data due to the 
limited size of the sample entails signiﬁ  cance issues 
in most cases. The responses of positive and negative 
nominal liquidity ﬂ   ows are shown in Chart  6.
To test the robustness of our structural approach, we 
compared impulse responses under four alternative 
identiﬁ  cation procedures: two Cholesky decompositions
with different orderings (keeping output ﬁ  rst in both 
cases), one generalised impulse decomposition 
as described by Pesaran and Shin (1998),
and one structural representation with long-run 
restrictions (the one reported in this paper). The 
shape and intensity of the response to output shocks 
is the most robust across all speciﬁ  cations.
Given the standard deviations of output, asset 
prices and the interest rate, impulse responses can 
be interpreted as follows. A one standard deviation 
(respectively 1%) positive shock to output would 
have an impact of around 0.2% (respectively 0.25%) 
and 0.28% (0.36%) on positive and negative liquidity 
ﬂ  ows. The impulse is rather persistent and halves 
only after a year (two quarters for outﬂ  ows). The 
pattern of responses to asset price and interest rate 
shocks is in line with the idea that liquidity ﬂ  ows 
are driven by “funding” versus “proﬁ  t” motives.
A one standard deviation shock to asset prices slows 
down liquidity inﬂ  ows by half a percentage point 
while it stimulates liquidity outﬂ  ows by around 
0.17%. This is the “portfolio management” effect. 
Finally, interest rate changes have a limited short 
run impact on liquidity ﬂ  ows. A 25-basis-point 
interest rate rise leads to an immediate increase of 
balance-sheet liquidity inﬂ  ows by 0.06% and decline 
of liquidity outﬂ  ows by 0.2%. While this latter 
impact is counter-intuitive from a macroeconomic 
21  An obvious alternative route would consist in fully analysing the trending properties of the variables and their seasonal ﬂ  uctuations within a cointegrated VAR framework. 
This is however beyond the scope of this article and left for alternative research. To ensure the statistical validity of our approach, we engage in a number of model checks 
that can be summarised as follows. 1. Stationarity: unit root tests on the inverse roots of the characteristic AR polynomial (Phillips-Perron and ADF) reveal that all roots 
have modulus less than one and lie inside the unit circle. Stationarity is accepted for all variables at the 5% signiﬁ  cance level (10% level for the interest rate, which is 
not surprising). 2. Lag-length: except from the AIC –well known to overestimate the lag-length– FPE, HQIC and SIC criteria indicate an appropriate lag-length of one. 
3. Residual tests: standard tests on residual autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity and normality reveal that the model is subject to a limited degree of statistical weakness. 
However, a closer look at the multivariate normality of the residuals reveal that deviations from normality mostly come from kurtosis rather than skewness.ARTICLES
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Bank gross liquidity ﬂ  ows realised within the French banking system between 1993 and 2005 reveal that 
in a context where bank liquidity is expanding overall, substantial liquidity expansions and contractions 
simultaneously coexist both at the bank level and on aggregate, suggesting intense and active market 
trading beyond the substantial growth in aggregate bank liquidity. In addition, excess liquidity reallocation, 
the “shadow” liquidity expansion and contraction within banks’ balance sheets on top of net ﬂ  ows, indicates 
extensive liquidity reshufﬂ  ing.
Bank liquidity exhibits interesting cyclical properties. Positive and negative ﬂ  ows procyclically lead the cycle 
by around two quarters, while excess balance-sheet reallocation countercyclically lags the cycle. These timing 
patterns may reﬂ  ect the multiple functions of liquidity within a bank – pure “funding” purposes and “trading” 
purposes. Furthermore, non-negligible positive idiosyncratic ﬂ  ows may reﬂ  ect some “macroeconomic caution” 
probably guided by regulatory constraints on banks liquidity management. Finally, impulse response analysis 
suggests that positive output shocks have a positive and persistent effect on liquidity ﬂ  ows. The pattern of 
responses to asset price and interest rate shocks is in line with the idea that liquidity ﬂ  ows are driven by “funding” 
versus “proﬁ  t” motives in the presence of a trade-off between expected returns and interest-rate risk.
Our ﬁ  ndings may have some relevance to liquidity regulation and lender of last resort policies. As for 
the domestic regulatory authorities, the clear emergence of macroeconomic patterns in bank liquidity 
suggests that current macroprudential approaches could be reinforced so as to meaningfully complement 
the individual monitoring of ﬁ  nancial institutions. The signiﬁ  cant scale of bank liquidity ﬂ  ows and their cyclical 
properties also appear to press the case for placing emphasis on the health of the ﬁ  nancial system as a 
whole when designing lender of last resort interventions. In particular, vigilance is warranted at times when 
liquidity ﬂ  ows tend to intensify, for example ahead of cyclical turnarounds. Overall, valuable information 
could be made available through the joint monitoring of market liquidity and bank liquidity risks when the 
prevention of individual liquidity failures is at stake.
All in all, further investigation is warranted on the mechanisms that can jointly elicit individual bank failure 
and ﬁ  nancial market runs. In particular, the macroeconomic determinants of bank liquidity as well as the 
interconnection between liquidity and market runs are promising areas for further research, with possible 
implications for emergency lending operations.ARTICLES
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